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Abstract
Existing tests of tournament theory have recently been criticized
for their failure to distinguish tournaments from other theories that
have similar eﬀects like standards and marginal productivity theory
(Gibbs, 1994, 1996; Prendergast, 1999). In this paper, we propose a
series of empirical tests that allow to make this distinction. We use
a dataset of average wages by rank in US economic departments over
the period 1977-1997 and link this information to individual production
data to test whether wage gaps aﬀect the productivity and cooperative
behavior of economists and to control for marginal productivity theory.
We ﬁnd that the wage gap is increasing along the hierarchy, even when
controlling for production by rank. Moreover, wages are more sensitive
to productivity for higher ranks. We ﬁnd some evidence that higher
wage gaps lead to higher productivity but not that wage gaps depend
on the number of contestants nor that they lead to less cooperation.
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1These ﬁndings tend to go in favor of the use of standards rather than
tournaments in economic departments.
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“No matter what we may say, none of us is a philosopher-
saint, and you can’t fully understand the development of eco-
nomic ideas without a sense of the structure of rewards that
economists face”,
Paul Krugman, Incidents from my career,
www.wws.princeton.edu/~pkrugman/incidents.html
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
A large literature has examined how relative performance evaluation (RPE)
schemes are helpful to improve the incentives provided by an organization
to its employees and to induce sorting of the most able individuals. In this
paper, we analyze the wage policy of U.S. economic departments over the
period 1977-1997 and link it to tournament theory (Lazear and Rosen, 1981),
the ﬁrst and more popular of these RPE theories. Tournament theory has
several implications about the way wages are structured in the hierarchy
so as to generate incentives and about the way individuals react to these
incentives.
The empirical literature testing tournament theory has mostly focused
on executive pay (see e.g. Eriksson, 1999; Conyon et al., 1999 and Bognanno,
2001 for recent exercises), where only the absolute top of the hierarchy was
considered and individual productivity was proxied by ﬁrm performance; or
more naturally on sport tournaments (see e.g. Ehrenberg and Bognanno,
1990a&b and Becker and Huselid, 1992) where individual performance is
immediately retrievable, but hierarchies are absent.
We extend the analysis to the academic world and more speciﬁcally to
the case of economic departments. The academic profession combines two
2important aspects: ﬁrst, there is a well-established three-layers hierarchy,
and second, it is possible to obtain measures of individual productivity and
cooperation since entry on the labor market, and therefore at each hier-
archical level, by looking at publications patterns. In a more and more
competitive academic environment, wage policy should be a key tool not
only for providing incentives but also for keeping and reallocating scarce
talent.
Another important criticism against existing papers is that most studies
did not test tournaments against other theories like standards or basic the-
ories of marginal productivity that have similar predictions (Gibbs, 1994,
1996; Prendergast, 1999). This is the main contribution of our paper, as
we run a series of empirical tests that allow us to distinguish between these
three theories.
We try to answer two questions. What are the main determinants of the
wage policy in an economic department, and more importantly, does the
wage structure inﬂuence the behavior of economists and how? To answer
these questions, we link our average wage by rank dataset to individual pro-
ductivity and cooperation data to assess the consequences of wage gaps. We
use the composition of economic departments in the 107 universities which
were ranked by the NRC in 1993 and link names to the bibliographic infor-
mation provided by EconLit. We also use the fact that we have information
on the entire population of the department to compute the average produc-
tivity by rank, so as to link the wage gap to the diﬀerences of productivity
of the diﬀerent ranks to control for marginal productivity theory.
We ﬁnd that the wage gaps are increasing with rank. This ﬁnding is
robust when controlling for productivity diﬀerences, and productivity dif-
ferences also explain part of the wage gap. Wages become more linked to
performance at higher ranks, indicating a sorting eﬀect as more productive
individuals are allocated to higher pay jobs along the career. We also ﬁnd
evidence that wage gaps lead to more productivity. However, the wage gap
does not appear to be aﬀected by the number of contestants, nor does it
inﬂuence cooperation among contestants. The evidence therefore suggests
the use of standards rather than tournaments in economic departments, and
3also the existence of a learning process about the talent of individuals along
the career, resulting in the sorting of individuals.
2 Theory and Empirical Predictions
This section introduces our main hypotheses and compares implications from
tournament theory, standards and marginal productivity theory. It also
discusses the intuition of our empirical strategy to distinguish between these
three theories.
2.1 Tournaments
Tournaments are a simple form of RPE where people receive a wage premium
if they beat their competitor. An analogy can easily be drawn with sport
contests, such as a sprinter winning a race, and can also be applied for
promotions along the hierarchy, for example in the succession of a CEO
or more generally for the allocation of individuals to higher responsability
levels. We provide hereafter a simpliﬁed version of Lazear and Rosen (1981).
The output produced by individual i is stochastic and depends on eﬀort
a:
qi = ai + εi
There is a cost of eﬀort Ψ(ai). There exists another worker j with similar
characteristics. The measurement error can itself be divided in two terms: a
term common to both workers reﬂecting the risk linked to the environment
(ν) and an individual speciﬁcn o i s eξk,k= i,j.
Suppose the wage of the worker is a combination of a ﬁxed part t and
a prize for winning W, so that the expected payment is t + pW,w h e r ep is
the probability of winning the tournament:
p =P r( qi >q j)=P r
¡
ai − aj >ξ j − ξi
¢
= G(ai − aj)
where G is the cumulative distribution function of normal ξj −ξi with mean
0 and variance 2σ2
ξ.
4The agent therefore selects eﬀort that maximizes his utility function
t + pW − Ψ(a):
Wg(ai − aj)=Ψ0 (ai)
where g is the probability distribution function. By symmetry ai = aj.
Assuming for simplicity that Ψ(a)=a2
2 , by selecting W = 1
g(0) the principal
can achieve the ﬁrst best. More generally, the higher the gap, the higher the
eﬀort exerted by the contestants.
This literature has since been extended and detailing the various de-
velopments is beyond the scope of this paper. We focus our attention to
testable hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: the value of winning should increase as
one goes up the promotion ladder (Rosen, 1986).
The intuition is that in a sequential game with N stages and s stages
remaining to be played, prizes are increasing in survival: ∆Ws > 0 ∀s.
Winning one step further gives the option to continue, but since there are
fewer steps remaining, the option value that determines the incentives of
the players plays out, so the wage gap must reﬂe c tt h el o s so ft h es u r v i v a l
option.
Hypothesis 2: the wage spread should be higher the
more there are contestants for the prize (McLaughlin,
1988)
This is a very intuitive ﬁnding: the more people are ﬁghting for a prize,
t h em o r ed i ﬃcult it is to obtain it, and the higher the prize should be to
provide the same level of incentives. While equilibrium eﬀort is not aﬀected,
the wage spread is increasing in the number of contestants1.
1As noted by Eriksson (1999), it is less obvious to ﬁnd how the level of eﬀort aﬀects
the probability of winning as the number of contestants increases. See also Nalebuﬀ and
Stiglitz (1983).
5Hypothesis 3: higher wage gaps should be associated
with higher productivity
This proceeds directly from the theory, as higher gaps lead to better
incentives. This implies that universities with higher gaps should perform
better, either in terms of publications or in terms of rankings.
Hypothesis 4: higher wage gaps should reduce coopera-
tive behavior among contestants (Lazear, 1989)
While competition among contestants provides incentives to exert more
eﬀort, it could also discourage contestants to cooperate, or even induce them
to sabotage each other’s work. It might therefore be eﬃc i e n tt oh a v el o w e r
wage gaps to avoid this negative sabotage behavior, at the expense of lower
productive eﬀort.
2.2 Standards
Standards are another simple form of promotion scheme, where all individ-
uals who reach an established threshold are promoted. The stylized model
and discussion below is based on Gibbs (1996). Instead of beating their
competitor (a moving target), workers must now beat the standard S es-
t a b l i s h e de xa n t eb yt h eﬁrm. This means that the probability of being
promoted becomes:
p =P r( qi >S )=1− Pr(S − ai >ε i)=1− H (S − ai)
where H is the cumulative distribution function of a normal with mean
0a n dv a r i a n c eσ2
ε.T h eﬁrst order condition becomes:
Wh(S − ai)=Ψ0 (ai)
where h is the probability distribution function. Incentives are larger
when a∗ = S. By setting W = 1
h(0), the principal can obtain ﬁr s tb e s te f -
fort. Therefore the wage gap (hypothesis 3) has the same incentive property
6than in the tournament model. It is also still the case that hypothesis 1 holds
following the same reasoning. However, hypotheses 2 and 4 no longer hold,
because the other contestants of the game are not true competitors. Stan-
dards are therefore a safeguard against the potential negative sabotaging
eﬀects of tournaments.
There are other diﬀerences between standards and tournaments that are
worth stressing. First, standards do not ﬁlter out the common term. When
there is a lot of common uncertainty, tournaments provide a form of insur-
ance from the external environment. Second, by imposing a minimum level
of absolute performance, standards provide a better selection of individuals.
Third, under tournaments, the number of positions available is ﬁxed while
it varies according to performance in the case of standards. Therefore, if a
position needs to be ﬁlled, ﬁrms are more likely to resort to tournaments.
2.3 Marginal Productivity Theory
Marginal productivity theory simply implies that agents are rewarded ac-
cording to their productivity. In the context of the ﬁrm hierarchy, the theory
can be associated to models of optimal span of controls, where talent in the
higher levels of the hierarchy is diﬀused through the diﬀerent layers, imply-
ing that talent is more valuable in the higher levels and therefore deserves
higher reward (see e.g. Rosen, 1982). An interesting aspect of the acad-
emic profession is that it is debatable whether the decisions of individuals
in the higher ranks aﬀect the productivity of the workers in the lower ranks.
Nevertheless, it can also be argued that talent in the high ranks generates
positive externalities on those below them. If individual wages are also set
on the basis of past achievements, increasing wage gaps (hypothesis 1) could
also reﬂect the fact that higher ranked individuals have been more produc-
tive. Talent reveals itself as individuals start producing. Sorting emerges
as a consequence of the survival game, as exit and reallocation proceed.
By the same token, if the more able individuals are sorted in the higher
wage universities and if individuals have reached the higher ranks follow-
ing a selection process, then the fact that higher wage gaps lead to higher
7productivity (hypothesis 3) could also be a consequence of the sorting
eﬀect, rather than reﬂecting the incentive eﬀect. There are no clear impli-
cation concerning propositions 2 and 4, except if one allows for (positive or
negative) externalities of talent, independently of incentives.
2.4 Our Approach
Our empirical strategy proceeds as follows. We test the four hypotheses
and compare the results with what standards and tournament theory would
predict. As shown above, these theories have conﬂicting implications re-
garding the eﬀect of the number of individual by rank on the prize and the
consequences of the size of the prize on cooperation or sabotage. When
performing these tests, we control for marginal productivity theory by dis-
aggregating the wage gap in two components: one part that reﬂects past
productivity diﬀerentials and therefore controls for the fact that promotions
lead to sorting, and a residual that reﬂects incentives. The procedure is
described in details in section 4. The next section describes the dataset and
discusses the weaknesses of our approach.
3D a t a
3.1 University Level Data
Every year the American Economic Association (AEA) sends to economic
departments the Universal Academic Questionnaire (UAQ) where informa-
tion is asked on, among other things, average salaries by category of jobs (as-
sistant, associate and full professors), the size of the department by category
and the number of degrees awarded. We use the answers to these surveys for
the years 1977 to 1997, providing a total of 2,100 observations2or on average
2Unfortunately, only few departments have participated every year so we have an un-
balanced panel. From 2,338 university-year pairs, we further excluded observations where
we did not have information on all ranks (186 cases), where the average salary was less
then 10,000 $ (8 outliers), and where the natural rank order was not observed (44 -mostly
when assistant professors average wage was higher than associate professors wage). Re-
8100 departments a year. Salaries are deﬂated using the GDP-implicit price
deﬂator (the base year is 1998).
Average real wages have increased over time for all 3 categories. In 1977,
an economic department paid on average 64,000 $ to its professors, in 1997 it
was about 85,000$. The average wage of associate professors increased from
48,000$ to 63,000$ and the assistant professors from 38,000$ to 53,000$.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the average wage gap. While the wage
diﬀerence between associate and full professors has remained quite constant
over time, the gap between assistant professors and the other categories has
decreased over time. At ﬁrst sight, our data conﬁrm the ﬁrst prediction of
tournament theory: in 1998, on average, the gap between the salary of an
assistant professor and the salary of an associate professor was about 19%
while the gap between the salary of an associate professor and the salary of
a full professor was about 35%. This tends to indicate that the wage gap is
increasing with the job level.
Another interesting feature of our dataset is that the variance increases
with rank as well (Table 1). This could suggest that promotions lead to pay
diﬀerentiation, while pay is relatively similar at the assistant professor level.
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10As we also have data on departments in both public (70 to 80%) and
private (20 to 30%) universities, we can bring further evidence on the well
known widening gap between public and private universities (see e.g. Alexan-
der, 2001 and The Economist, 2000). Figure 2 shows the evolution of the
gap between private and public departments for the diﬀerent level. Private
universities do pay better, especially at the level of the professors. However,
the diﬀerence for assistant professors is fairly small. Note also that for all
three job levels, the diﬀerence has increased over time3.
3.2 Internal Labor Markets and the Eﬀect of External Com-
petition
Tournaments take place in the context of an internal labor market with no
explicit role for outside options. We check whether this important hypothesis
is valid in economic departments. The UAQ also provides information on
the number of hires, promotions and leaves by year and by rank. Using
all observations for which we have data on the number of faculty in t and
t − 1, and on the internal and external moves, we compute three variables:
the percentage of individuals leaving the department by year and by rank,
the percentage of newly hired individuals by year and by rank, and the
percentage of newly hired individuals coming from outside the department
by year and by rank. Table 2 shows the average of these three variables.
Table 2: Average Internal and Outside Mobility
Rank % of individuals %o fn e w % of new individuals
leaving the department individuals hired hired from the outside
Professors 3.6 % 5.5 % 28 %
Associates 3% 12.1 % 25 %
Assistants 1.5 % 19.1 % 95.8 %
3A problem so far has been that our sample is changing over time. To see whether
things would change if we had complete panel, we also looked at the 52 universities for
which we have observations both at the beginning and at the end of our period. We
basically get the same results.
11The average percentage of individuals leaving the department is rela-
tively small and increasing with ranks, while the average percentage of
individuals who are new in the department is decreasing with rank, and
relatively large at the assistant professor level, which, in the case of the aca-
demic labor market, can clearly be described as a port of entry, as 95% of
the new assistant professors are hired from the outside, while this percentage
decreases dramatically with rank. These statistics are consistent with the
idea of internal competition for jobs. However, around one quarter of new
individuals are still hired from the outside at the higher ranks, suggesting
that external competition also plays a non negligible role (see Chang, 1996
for a theoretical analysis). Unfortunately, we are not able to control for
external competition with our dataset.
3.3 Individual Data
We further use information about the entire population of individuals related
to 107 universities which were ranked by the NRC in 19934. This dataset
contains 2,673 individuals and provides the name, rank and university to
which they are aﬃliated during the academic year 1992-1993. These names
were linked to the bibliographic information in EconLit. This allows us
not only to look at the performance of individuals in terms of research but
also gives us the possibility to look at their cooperative behavior (through
co-authorship).
The department composition, together with the bibliographic record of
each individual, was then matched with the wage dataset. Wages for each
layer were available for 50 universities (the list is available from the au-
thors), among them 13 are private. This provides information about 1,291
4A sar o b u s t n e s sc h e c k ,w ea l s ou s e dt h e7 t ha n dt h e9 t he d i t i o no ft h eGuide to
Graduate Study in Economics to get information on the faculty of the departments. The
7th edition (academic years 1982-1984) gives for each department, the names of the faculty
and their rank (from assistant to full professor). The 9th edition (academic year 1994-1995)
in addition gives information on the date and the university of Ph.D. though sometimes
lacks information on ranks. In a longer version of the paper, we also show the results
using this alternative source.
12individuals. More than half of them are full professors (694 individuals or
53.8% of the sample), the category of associate professors is composed of 292
individuals (or 22.6% of the sample) and the others are assistant professors
(305 individuals, or 23.6% of the sample).
To disaggregate university production by category of job, we use the
list of the names and the ranks of individuals working in the department as
provided in the 1992 survey of the NRC. For each individual, we constructed
the publication history between 1969 and 1998 from EconLit. This allows
us to compute the mean number of publications per rank for each of the 107
doctoral programs included in the NRC survey.
Publications are adjusted for quality and corrected for coauthorship,
dividing the weight of the paper by the number of coauthors. Diﬀerent
quality weights have been proposed in the literature an we selected one
methodology, suggested in Bauwens (1998). Each journal receives a weight
between one and ﬁve on the basis of the product of the impact factor and the
total number of citations received during a given year (the latter reﬂecting
better the long run) and then gives weight 1 to journals not included in
the Journal Citation Report (JCR) but included in Econlit, because the
non-JCR included journals are quite likely to be rarely cited ones. This
method has the advantage of being simple and of weighting all journals.
One disadvantage is that weights can be seen as relatively subjective. We
also used publications weighted by the impact factor or the Laband and
Piette corrected impact factor of the journal and this yielded comparable
results.
It is important to stress that, while we gain some insight on the potential
variables inﬂuencing wages, we lose the time dimension. We were unfortu-
nately not able to follow the career of individuals5 as the survey was not
continued in subsequent years.
5In Coupé et al. (2003), we follow the career of a sample of 1,000 top economists
and linked their productivity to their career achievements, but without information about
individual wages.
134 Empirical analysis
4.1 Increasing Wage Gaps
Our ﬁrst test is to determine whether tournament prize (the wage gap) is
increasing along the promotion ladder. We regress the log of average wage
over a dummy for associate, a dummy for full professor and some controls.
logWjrt = α0 + α1ASSO+ α2PROF + α3Zjt + εjrt (1)
where j is an index for the university, r is an index for rank (r = PROF,
ASSO,ASST)a n dt is a time index. The variables included as controls are
a dummy for private universities and the size of the university (measured
by the number of degrees awarded, in hundreds), the latest being less well
reported. Results are presented in table 3.
Table 3: Wages and Ranks
Dep.var.: logW coeﬀ (s.e.)
ASSO 0.20∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.20∗∗∗ (0.004)
PROF 0.49∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.49∗∗∗ (0.004)
Nr.BA - 0.07∗∗∗ (0.004)
PRIV - 0.05∗∗∗ (0.002)
constant 10.63∗∗∗ (0.004) 10.57∗∗∗ (0.004)
Year dummies NO YES
Nr.Obs. 6300 5721
Adj. R2 0.56 0.75
Note: standard errors in parentheses, *** denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level
We ﬁnd evidence of an increasing relationship between wage and the
job level. As one moves up in the hierarchy, the gap increases. As can
be seen in the ﬁrst column, job levels alone explain 56% of the variance.
This ﬁnding supports one implication from tournament theory that the gap
between each layer of the hierarchy should become larger and larger, so as
to provide incentives to tournament participants to exert eﬀort and win the
prize. Size of the institution and its ownership also play an important role
in wage determination.
14However, one could argue that wage diﬀerentials simply reﬂect produc-
tivity diﬀerentials. To control for this possibility, we need a measure of per-
formance for each hierarchical layer. Universities are likely to reward
individuals on the basis of past accomplishments, reﬂecting their reputation
which increases the prestige of the university to which they are associated.
We create a variable called average past publication by rank (PPUB)b y
summing all papers produced by the individuals in our sample over the pe-
riod 1969-1992 over ranks and dividing by the number of individuals by
rank. We regress the log of wage gaps over the log of PPUB for all ranks,
controlling for ranks, as in Eq. (2):
logWjr = δ0 + δ1ASSO+ δ2PROF + δ3 logPPUBjr + εjr (2)








Note: see table 3
In table 4, we ﬁnd that publications matter, but also that promotion
premia are lower when controlling for production diﬀerentials. The raw gaps
for this subsample of 50 universities are 19% (from assistant to associate)
and 54% (from associate to professor). Correcting for past performance,
we get gaps of 8% and 38%. Despite this reduction is size, we still ﬁnd
increasing wage gaps.
We also ran the equation for each rank separately:
logWjr = γ0 + γ1 logPPUBjr + ε0
jr∀r (3)
15Table 5: wage and past performance (by type of job)
Dep.var.: logWprof logWASSO logWASST
constant 10.37∗∗∗ (0.14) 10.61∗∗∗ (0.1) 10.79∗∗∗ (0.02)
logPPUB 0.27∗∗∗ (0.04) 0.13∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.02 (0.015)
Nr.Obs 50 50 50
Adj. R2 0.50 0.22 0.01
Note: see table 3
Table 5 presents the results. An interesting ﬁnding is that wages are
more performance related at higher levels of the hierarchy. This appears to
indicate a learning and selection eﬀect, the most productive scholars being
allocated to the more lucrative positions. This relates to the stylized fact
that the variance of wages was more important for higher ranks.
One way to control for university ﬁxed eﬀects in the salary level would
be to regress the diﬀerence of the log wages over the diﬀerence of the log
past publications. Indeed, if
logWj,PROF = α0 + α1 logPPUBj,PROF + νj + ξPROF
logWj,ASSO = α0
0 + α0
1 logPPUBj,ASSO + νj + ξASSO
logWj,ASST = α00
0 + α00
1 logPPUBj,ASST + νj + ξASST
where εjr = νj + ξjr,ν j is university ﬁxed eﬀect and ξjr ∼ N (0,σjr).
Then, by regressing instead
logWj,PROF−logWj,ASSO = β0+β1 (logPPUBj,PROF − logPPUBj,ASSO)+εP−A
(4)
and similarly we get rid of the university ﬁxed eﬀect.
logWj,ASSO−logWj,ASST = β0
0+β0
1 (logPPUBj,ASSO − logPPUBj,ASST)+εA−A
(5)
Results are presented in table 6. We ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of publication:
higher wage gaps are partly explained by higher publication gaps. Moreover,
the diﬀerence in the constant again indicates an increasing wage gap. Fi-
nally, the sensitivity of wage gaps to productivity diﬀerences increases along
16the career. What we do not control for in this speciﬁcation is that there
could be a university-by-rank ﬁxed eﬀects. To properly address this issue,
we would have needed a panel dataset.
A related alternative explanation for wage gaps is experience. Individuals
would accumulate human capital and wages would be linked to seniority.
Changes in experience could also have an inﬂuence on the evolution of the
wage gap. We checked this hypothesis using individual data of the 9th
Guide to Graduate Study in Economics which gave for some universities the
year of Ph.D. Controlling for the average experience level, we did not ﬁnd
signiﬁcant eﬀect of experience. It is likely that this ﬁnding is due to the lack
of suﬃcient variation in average experience level by rank.
Table 6: Wage Gaps and Past Publication Diﬀerences
Dep.var.: logWPROF − logWASSO logWASSO − logWASST
constant 0.28∗∗∗ (0.026) 0.15∗∗∗ (0.022)
logPPUBPROF − logPPUBASSO 0.12∗∗∗ (0.034) -
logPPUBASSO − logPPUBASST - 0.027∗∗ (0.01)
Nr.Obs 50 50
Adj. R2 0.18 0.06
Note: see table 3
There are also some elements that could explain the variation across
departments for which we can not control such as diﬀerences in teaching
loads. However, given the relative (compared to publications) unobservabil-
ity of the quality of teaching, relatively to other contestants, universities are
less likely to provide incentives in this area. A more pragmatic reason for
ignoring it was that the data were not available.
To sum up, economic departments have increasing wage gaps and this
ﬁnding can not be entirely explained by performance diﬀerentials. This
suggests that incentive-related motivations might lie at the origin of this
ﬁnding. We also ﬁnd evidence of sorting, as wages become more performance
related at higher ranks.
174.2 The Prize and the Number of Contestants
The second hypothesis that we want to test is whether the wage gap between
job ladders is a function of the number of participants. The more there
are participants, the more complicated it should be to win the prize, and
therefore, ex ante, a bigger reward should be needed to provide suﬃcient
incentives to contestants. We therefore regress the wage gap between the full
professor level and the associate professor level over the number of associate
professors waiting for promotion, controlling for size and type of institution.
logGAPj,PROF−ASSO = f(NR.ASSOj,PRIV j,SIZE j) (6)
and similarly, we regress the wage gap between the associate professor
level and the assistant professor level on the number of assistant professors
and the same controls as in the previous regression.
logGAPj,ASSO−ASST = f(NR.ASSTj,PRIV j,SIZE j) (7)
Results are provided in table 7. The number of contenders is positively
and signiﬁcantly related to the wage spread, in line with tournament the-
o r y .T h em o r ep e o p l ea r eﬁghting for the prize, the larger should the prize
be. The relationship is apparently stronger for the gap at the lower level
(GAPASSO−ASST).
Table 7: Eﬀect of the number of contestants on the wage gap
Dep.var.: logGAPPROF−ASSO logGAPASSO−ASST
Nr. Contestants 0.017∗∗∗ (0.004) 0.019∗∗∗ (0.005)
Nr.BA 0.18∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.12∗∗∗ (0.015)
PRIV 0.33∗∗∗ (0.028) 0.23∗∗∗ (0.03)
constant 9.30∗∗∗ (0.005) 8.85∗∗∗ (0.06)
Nr.Obs. 1853 1852
Adj. R2 0.19 0.10
Note: see table 3
There are two problems associated with our speciﬁcation. The ﬁrst dif-
ﬁculty is that part of the wage gap reﬂects diﬀerences in average past pro-
ductivity between ranks. To control for diﬀerences in productivity by rank,
18we ﬁrst regress the log of the wage gap over the log of the gap in average
cumulative publications (see Eq. 4 and 5).
The part which is not explained by the publication diﬀerential is the
corrected wage gap (CGAP). We then regress the corrected wage gap over
the number of (absolute and relative) contestants.
CGAPj,PROF−ASSO = f(NR.CONTESTANTSj) (8)
CGAPj,ASSO−ASST = f(NR.CONTESTANTSj) (9)
Results are reported in tables 8. We ﬁnd a positive and slightly signiﬁcant
eﬀect of the number of assistant professors per associate professor, but a
negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect of the number of associate professors per pro-
fessor. The result can be linked to the observed hierarchical structure of
economic departments. Contrarily to ﬁrms where the hierarchy is organized
in a pyramide-like scheme, the largest layer in departments is composed of
professors, while the number of associates is usually smaller than the num-
ber of assistants. This could explain why there seems to be a tournament
eﬀect in the ﬁrst round of promotion (from assistant to associate), but not
in the second. To sum up, we do not ﬁnd a clear eﬀect of the number of
contestants on the wage gap.
Table 8: The eﬀect of the number of (absolute) contestants on
the corrected wage gap
Dep.var.: CGAPPROF−ASSO CGAPASSO−ASST
Nr. Contestants 0.006 (0.005) 0.007∗ (0.004)
constant 0.32∗∗∗ (0.035) 0.11∗∗∗ (0.02)
Nr.Obs. 50 50
Adj. R2 0.01 0.04
Note: see table 3
The second problem is that we use the absolute number of contestants.
By doing this, we do not control for the number of positions available. In
the literature on ﬁrms one generally takes the number of board-members
(in other words, divided by 1 CEO) as a proxy for the chance of winning
19the prize6. A solution could be to divide the number of contestants by the
number of existing positions in the upper level. Indeed one could argue that
the probability to be promoted will increase with the number of existing
positions. However, the fact that there are many people in the higher ranks
can also mean that the positions have been ﬁlled recently. Our results were
not qualitatively diﬀerent using this deﬁnition.
4.3 Incentive Eﬀect
Do economists at the assistant and associate level produce more in higher
gaps universities? Are people responding to incentives? To check this, we
test whether we can ﬁnd a relationship between production on the one hand
and wage gap on the other. To avoid reversed causality, we use individ-
ual publications (weighted for coauthorship and adjusted for quality, as for
past publications) during the period 1993-1995 as a measure of performance
(PERF).
We regress this productivity variable over the log of the wage gap in the
university where the individual is aﬃliated:
PERFi = λ0 + λ1GAPjr + λ2ASSO + εi (10)
where GAPjr is logGAPj,ASSO−ASST if individual i is assistant professor
and logGAPj,PROF−ASSO if he is associate. We ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁ-
cant eﬀect of the wage gap on individual performance (table 9). A doubling
of the wage gap would lead to an increase of the average production by rank
of 1 AER-equivalent article. Assistant professors in our sample appear to
be more productive than associate professors. This comparison only reﬂects
cross-sectional diﬀerences between individuals in the subsamples, and not
necessarily a dynamic reduction of productivity after the ﬁrst promotion
(on the latest see Coupé et al., 2003).
6Eriksson (1999) ﬁnds that for each additional manager with “signiﬁcant” responsi-
bilities, the wage gap increase by 1.8%. Conyon et al. (2001) ﬁnd that each additional
board-member increases the gap by 3.5%. Bognanno (2001) ﬁnally shows that each ad-
ditional vice president increases the gap between the president and the vice-presidents
salary by 4%.







Note: see table 3
Previously we noticed that part of the wage gap was due not to incentives
reasons but to productivity diﬀerential. To correct for this, we use once again






Results are presented in table 10. We see that when we use the part of
the wage gap reﬂecting pure incentives, we ﬁnd a more important eﬀect of
the wage gap, a doubling of the corrected wage gap being associated with
an increase by 1.5 AER equivalent article on average.







Note: see table 3
4.4 Cooperation
A disadvantage of tournament incentives is that they will decrease the will-
ingness to cooperate with colleagues of the same rank. We ask two questions:
ﬁrst, do professors collaborate more internally (within department) within
21rank as they are not in competition anymore? Second, do we ﬁnd more
‘internal within rank’ cooperation in departments that have smaller wage
gaps? The idea behind this test is that high prize associated with promo-
tions will discourage potential contestants to collaborate when performance
is relative but not when there is an absolute threshold to beat7.
To test these two hypotheses, we create a variable called internal coop-
e r a t i o nw i t h i nr a n k( ICWR) by dividing the number of papers coauthored
within university within rank (i.e. with other contestants) by the total
number of publications, over the period 1993-1995. We also create a vari-
able called cooperation (COOP) by dividing coauthored papers by the total
number of papers over the same period. To provide a snapshot of how coop-
erative behavior depends on rank, average internal cooperation within rank
and cooperation are presented in table 11.





Note: standard deviations in parentheses
We ﬁnd that, among those economists who published at least one pa-
per over the period (949 individuals or 73.5% of the sample), 63.5% of the
papers are coauthored. Moreover, associate professors are those who coop-
erated more during that period. On the other hand, they are also those who
cooperated less within rank. However, the number of associate professors
is often smaller than the number of assistant professors and much smaller
than the number of professors.
We then relate ICWR to the log of the wage gap as in the previous
subsection. Because there are a lot of people who do not cooperate at all
or cooperate on all their papers, we prefer to use a dichotomic variable as
7We do not consider the strategic formation of coalitions between potential contestants
in a multi-prize tournament setting. To rule this out, it is enough to assume that learning
about talent is slow so that potential contestants can not assess their relative quality.
22dependent variable and create a dummy DICWR equal to 1 if individual
cooperated internally within rank on at least one paper and 0 otherwise.
Individuals who did not publish did not cooperate neither and were assigned
value of 0 (we relax this assumption infra). In our sample, 43 assistant
professors (around 14% of the sample) and 23 associate professors (around
8% of the sample) cooperated within rank.
We run a probit analysis:
ICWR∗
i = µ0 + µ1GAPjr + µ2ASSOi + εi
DICWRi =1 if ICWR∗
i > 0
DICWRi =0 if ICWR∗
i ≤ 0







Note: see table 3
Table 12 shows the marginal changes. We ﬁnd negative but not signif-
icant eﬀect of the wage gap. Cooperative behavior within rank does not
appear to be aﬀected by wage gaps. On the other hand, we ﬁnd that asso-
ciate professors tend to cooperate signiﬁcantly less within rank.












Note: see table 3
Table 13 shows that the same conclusions prevail: the wage gap does not
aﬀect signiﬁcantly cooperation within rank and associate professors appear
to cooperate less internally within rank.
We also added the number of colleagues by rank as an additional control
but results were unchanged. However, when we considered the subsample
of individuals who published, then the associate professor dummy was no
longer signiﬁcant and the number of colleagues had a positive eﬀect on
internal cooperation within rank.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
We have used a very rich panel dataset providing average wage and depart-
ment size at each level of the economic departments’ hierarchy over more
than twenty years to test empirically key elements of tournament theory.
We provide evidence that wage gaps are increasing with the job level, even
when controlling for diﬀerences in productivity by rank. Moreover, average
wages increase with productivity along the career, suggesting the presence
of sorting, as the more productive economists are being matched with the
more productive universities, which also pay higher wages. We ﬁnd that
individual productivity is positively linked to wage gaps, i.e. wage gaps
have an incentive eﬀect. However, we do not ﬁnd strong evidence that the
number of contestants inﬂuences wage gaps, nor that wage gaps are associ-
ated with less cooperation among contestants. These ﬁndings would tend
to support the existence of standards rather than tournaments in economic
24departments.
An additional way, suggested by Gibbs (1994), to distinguish between
these two theories is to examine the extent to which job slots are ﬁxed. To
check this, we looked whether the organizational structure remained stable
over time by comparing the share of each hierarchical layer in 1983 and 1992.
On average, these shares changed by about 10% over a ten year period, which
again goes in favor of standards.
Why would economic departments choose standards rather than tour-
naments? Part of the answer could be linked to the importance of selecting
high quality candidates. Standards allow a better control over quality than
tournaments by setting an absolute threshold. Given that promotions are
associated with high job security, the decision is often irreversible and costs
of a wrong selection could be very high. Another reason could be the im-
portance of cooperation or more generally helping your colleagues for their
research.
However, the costs and beneﬁts of using one rather than another pro-
motion system could vary over time. For example, the standard used could
depend on the supply of talented individuals and therefore will contain a
part of comparison. A similar result is obtained if the organization is con-
strained by quantity or budget and only oﬀers a limited amount of slots.
Another aspect to be considered is the dynamic nature of the way standards
are set. While considered as exogenous by the contestants, standards are
established by the organization so as tog u a r a n t e eag i v e nl e v e lo fs o r t i n g
and are probably set by learning by doing, i.e. by observing the eﬀect of
previously established standards on the (past) talent pool and can be in-
terpreted as a tournament against the past. These remarks imply that the
distinction between standards and tourn a m e n t si sl e s sc l e a rc u ti nr e a l i t y .
These issues are left for future research.
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